John Leslie, IMMORTALITY DEFENDED by Stevenson, Leslie
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 26 Issue 2 Article 12 
4-1-2009 
Leslie, IMMORTALITY DEFENDED 
Leslie Stevenson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Stevenson, Leslie (2009) "Leslie, IMMORTALITY DEFENDED," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society 
of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 26 : Iss. 2 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol26/iss2/12 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
228 Faith and Philosophy
public reason. Ambitious theocrats endorse the positions that they do for 
religious reasons. In appealing to religious reasons, ambitious theocrats 
are embodying the value of liberty of conscience, for it is by their exercise 
of the liberty of conscience that they come to endorse the positions that 
they do. For this reason, liberal political theorists ought to be open to the 
possibility of allowing ambitious theocrats to invoke religious reasons in 
the public square (p. 125).
Swaine’s book should be commended for its sensitive and nuanced 
treatment of religion. The paradox, of course, is that Conscience is not like-
ly to be read by the very theocrats that could most profit from reading it. 
The most likely readers of Conscience are the liberal political theorists who 
already agree with Swaine’s message. The fact that fine books like Con-
science are probably only going to be read by the people who already agree 
with them is a testament to the reality that we are not really dialoguing 
with the other belief systems that exist alongside our own in the contem-
porary public square. If both sides of the public religion debate were to 
read reconciliation proposals like Swaine’s Conscience, it would go a long 
way toward overcoming this reality.
immortality Defended, by John Leslie. Blackwell, 2007. Pp. 97. $19.95 (cloth).
LeSLIe STeVeNSON, University of St. Andrews, Scotland
The title of John Leslie’s new slim volume is potentially misleading. Al-
though he offers three varieties of immortality, two of them involve it 
only in a Pickwickian sense. And the defense he has to offer (of all three) 
may be thought rather loose, at best. In fact, Leslie uses more than half 
his space trying to make plausible the underlying metaphysical picture 
that he is enamoured of, namely a combination of Platonism and Spinozist 
pantheism.
The most fundamental principle inspiring Leslie’s thought in this book 
is one he attributes to Plato: “The actual world of people and objects is a 
good one and it exists simply because it ought to. Its ethical requiredness—
the fact that there is an ethical need for it—is itself creatively effective” (p. 2). 
To this, Leslie adds his own interpretation of Spinoza: “There is a divine 
mind, a mind whose reality is due to the eternal ethical need for it. We, like 
all the other intricately structured things of our universe, exist merely be-
cause the mind in question thinks of this universe in all its details” (p. 3). 
As Leslie acknowledges, some theologians will not identify this meta-
physical “divine mind” with the personal, self-revelatory (indeed incar-
nate) God they believe in.
Not content with this degree of speculation, Leslie proceeds to add two 
dimensions of infinity. Unsatisfactory features of our lives prompt him 
to speculate that the divine mind might also think of immensely many 
other universes, thereby making them just as real as the imperfect one we 
inhabit (pp. 7, 10). Then, without apparent motivation, Leslie announces 
that ”this book will defend a pantheism of infinitely many divine minds, 
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each contemplating everything worth contemplating” (p. 11). He expands 
on this in chapter three.
But why should we believe any of this? (And what difference would it 
make if we did?) In chapter two, Leslie’s defense seems to consist of name-
dropping and counter-attack. The names mentioned are Plato, Plotinus, 
Aquinas, Maimonides, Leibniz, Paul Tillich, Hans Kung, Nicholas Rescher, 
Hugh Rice, and Derek Parfit. But, of course, one could readily compile a 
similarly comprehensive list of philosophers and theologians who would 
not touch such speculations with a mental barge-pole. Either way, name-
dropping does not get you anywhere in philosophy.
Leslie’s objections to objections (pp. 22ff) contain the nearest approxi-
mation to philosophical argument that I can see in this book, and I find 
them weak. He tries to face down the protest that no abstract fact, such as 
an ethical requirement, can ever influence the world: “What, can’t they? 
Toss a coin ten times. While you might get ten heads, various rather ab-
stract facts make you ten times more likely to get just one.” But that con-
clusion depends on the crucial physical assumption that the coin is a fair 
one, not unequally weighted toward the side with a head. The relevant 
mathematical truths (call them facts if you will) only apply to the case on 
that assumption. A similar point applies to the other two examples Leslie 
offers—the possibilities and impossibilities of sliding fifteen numbered 
squares around a board depend on the physical assumption that they are 
rigid, so they can’t be squeezed past or over each other. If three groups of 
five lions enter a wood and only fourteen come out, the expectation that 
one lion remains in there depends on the assumptions that there is no 
other way out (e.g., no tunnels or helicopter lifts), and moreover that the 
remaining lion has not died and been scavenged, and has not given birth.
Leslie’s next ploy is to suggest that an ethical requirement is analogous 
to a causal requirement in that both can sometimes be said to be satisfied, 
or fulfilled. But he admits straight away that this cannot prove the Platonic 
view, it only gives it “a chance of being right” (p. 23)—and there are simi-
lar admissions on pages 32 and 34. If that is the best that can be done by 
way of justifying such metaphysical claims, why bother?
There follows an attack on emotivism, prescriptivism and ethical rela-
tivism. But even if we agree with this, and hold that ethical requirements 
are objective, and that statements of them are true in some sense of that 
much fought-over word, that does nothing to show that ethical require-
ments have creative, quasi-causal necessity, as Leslie alleges. He fiercely 
rejects the suggestion that ethical requirements should be verifiable, or 
verified experimentally. What he appears to be so scornful about is the 
idea that they can be demonstrated beyond all logically possible doubt, a 
standard which few, if any of our beliefs, can reach. We will all agree with 
Leslie that we are quite certain that babies should be moved away from 
flames. The point on which I suspect he is so sensitive is that there seems 
to be no prospect of any sort of justification, let alone conclusive verifi-
cation, for his metaphysical claims about the causality of the extremely 
abstract ethical requirement for the world to exist because it would a good 
thing for it to exist.
The defense of immortality promised in the title comes in chapter four. 
The first variety is implicit in treating time as a fourth dimension, akin 
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to space, i.e., seeing the whole scheme of things as an unchanging four- 
dimensional block universe, as Einstein suggested. On this view, all 
events—past, present and future—are equally real, and the fact that we 
are finite in our temporal extent is supposed to be no more regrettable than 
the fact that our bodies are finite in space. Since there is no real change, 
all our lives eternally exist as parts of the total four-dimensional block. 
Whether that measures up to what you may have wanted to mean by ‘im-
mortality,’ I leave it to you, dear reader, to judge. So does Leslie. What he 
does not seem to offer is any argument to prefer the four-dimensional 
view to its traditional rival, which takes change to be real in some more 
substantial sense.
Leslie’s second offer seems to involve a more traditional conception of 
an afterlife. “Even if our experiences are simply elements in a divine mind’s 
thinking, why shouldn’t we have new ones after our bodies had died?” (p. 61). 
In his pantheistic picture, such post mortem thoughts and experiences 
“would simply be cases where the divine thoughts took on a radically 
new character”(p. 62). Well, as far as I can see, just about anything is pos-
sible (apart from contradictions) in Leslie’s pantheistic picture—but I do 
not find that a recommendation. He suspects that his personal identity 
“depends as little on my ever really having had a body as it does on my 
toenails” (p. 63). Speaking for myself, as a bassoon-player, a mountain-
walker, a husband and a father, I’m not so sure.
The third and last offer is a version of something traditional in some 
non-Western cultures—absorption into the One. Leslie’s third kind of im-
mortality would consist in the carrying of our life-patterns within a single 
continued existent—either the universe, or a divine mind. Would this 
count as personal survival? Leslie finds the concept of personal identity 
too nebulous to decide (p. 67). If you are not impressed with any of these 
offers, don’t worry; you can have all three together, says Leslie (p. 68).
According to the blurb from Jack Smart, “this is an admirable piece 
of philosophical speculation, in the grand manner of great philosophers 
of the past, but informed by modern cosmology.” I would suggest two 
amendments to that: (1) Insert ‘some of the’ before ‘great’ (what about 
Kant?—how can would-be philosophers still indulge in such speculation, 
without at least addressing his strictures on metaphysics?), and (2) Unless 
you are prone to admire unbridled, in-principle unverifiable, speculation, 
delete the word ‘admirable.’
